The Chinese Communists have developed a peculiar brand of soul surgery which they practice with impressive skill-the process of "thought reform." They first demonstrated this to the American public during the Korean conflict. . . . And more recently we have seen . . . Western civilians released from Chinese prisons, repeating their false confessions, insisting upon their guilt, praising the "justice" and "leniency" which they have received, and expounding the "truth" and "righteousness" of all Communist doctrine.
-R. J. Lifton (1956) In the 1950s, the American public became concerned that Chinese Communists had been able to convert American prisoners of war to Communist doctrine. The soldiers' apparent rejection of American values was counterintuitive and surprising because of the importance of these values to Americans. There was a general consensus that the readiness of American personnel to surrender their prior convictions was due to the failure of "formal and informal instructional institutionshome, school, army, etc.-to provide these soldiers with sufficient knowledge of 'American' ideals and the reasons for maintaining them" (McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961, p. 328) . In other words, it was hypothesized that the vulnerability of American values could be reduced if people were taught explicit reasons for maintaining the values. Yet, in more than four subsequent decades, this provocative hypothesis has not been tested. The present research provides the first empirical examination of this hypothesis by testing whether the provision of cognitive support for a value increases its resistance to subsequent attack.
Values as Truisms
Not only was the issue of value conversion important 40 years ago, it is still important today. The vulnerability of values to attack is a contemporary problem when one considers that indoctrination processes implemented by religious cults typically attack cherished values (R. S. Baron, 2000; Singer, 1995) . In addition, from a theoretical perspective, the observation that values can be radically changed is counterintuitive because of the importance attached to them. Indeed, values have been defined as abstract goals (e.g., equality, freedom, pleasure) that people consider to be important guiding principles in their lives and are considered to be among the most fundamental social psychological constructs (Feather, 1990; Rohan, 2000; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992 Schwartz, , 1996 . Values encapsulate the aspirations of individuals and societies and encompass deeply engrained standards that determine future directions and justify past actions (Braithwaite & Scott, 1991; Kluckhohn, 1951) . 1 Moreover, research has revealed that values are central in people's cognitive networks of attitudes and beliefs (Gold & Robbins, 1979; Gold & Russ, 1977; Thomsen, Lavine, & Kounios, 1996) . Thus, there are good reasons to believe that values should be strongly protected and resistant to attack.
Nevertheless, values may be at least somewhat vulnerable if people simply accept the importance of values without developing cognitive support for their values. Without this support, people may have difficulty generating counterarguments against messages attacking values, which is important because the ability to counterargue attacks is one of the key inhibitors of persuasion (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) , particularly when the issue is personally important (Zuwerink & Devine, 1996) . Indeed, the Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion (ELM) (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) suggests that the strength of an attitude (i.e., its persistence or its ability to resist persuasive attacks) is based, in part, on the degree of elaboration or thinking the person has done about the attitude object. In particular, consistent with McGuire and Papageorgis (1961) , the ELM proposes that resistance to persuasive attack is based on "motivating or enabling people to engage in additional thought about the reasons or arguments supporting their attitudes" (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, p. 182) . Consistent with this hypothesis, attitudes that have been subject to elaboration are more resistant to persuasive attacks, irrespective of whether elaboration is measured by individual differences in need for cognition (Haugvedt & Petty, 1992) or by varying the personal relevance of messages (Haugvedt & Wegener, 1994) . Thus, an important issue is whether values lack prior elaboration or cognitive support.
The recently formulated values-as-truisms hypothesis suggests that values do often lack the requisite cognitive support (Maio & Olson, 1998) . According to this hypothesis, there is little debate over the importance of values per se, despite controversies over ways to implement particular values (e.g., affirmative action programs to promote equality). Instead, it is taken for granted that values are inherently desirable. As a result, values are supported primarily by socially conditioned feelings and people do not bother to build cognitive support for values.
A series of experiments (Maio & Olson, 1998 ) obtained support for the values-as-truisms hypothesis. Based on the finding that analyzing reasons for attitudes causes attitude change only when attitudes have little cognitive support (Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, & Lisle, 1989) , Maio and Olson (1998) predicted that analyzing reasons for values should cause value change if values lack cognitive support. In contrast, if people have coherent and previously derived reasons supporting their values, these reasons should be accessed during a reasons analysis, and the reasons should not cause value change. Results indicated that analyzing reasons did cause value change, and, as expected, this effect was eliminated when participants were provided with cognitive support for their values in a prior laboratory session.
Maio and Olson (1998) described several additional implications of the values-as-truisms hypothesis. First, they suggested that the lack of cognitive support is important because cognitive support could potentially make values exert a stronger impact on behavior in situations that challenge the values. Subsequent research supported this hypothesis by demonstrating that making salient cognitive support for a value increases pro-value behavior in situations that challenge the value, over and above the effect of making the value salient (Maio, Olson, Allen, & Bernard, 2001 ). Maio and Olson (1998) also suggested that cognitive support should facilitate resistance to a direct persuasive attack. That is, although the strong affective support for values and their egorelevance should help make values more resistant to attack (persuasion) than other less affectively supported beliefs (e.g., medical truisms; see below), values that have been given cognitive support should be more resistant to persuasion than values that have not been given this support. Theoretically, the provision of defenses for values should increase people's ability to elaborate the values and facilitate counterarguing of messages against the values. As noted above, this hypothesis was first advanced in the controversy following the "brainwashing" of American prisoners in the Korean War and is the focus of the present research.
Types of Defenses
To evaluate the potential effects of cognitive support on resistance to persuasive attacks against values, it is important to consider the means for providing this support. Using a biological analogy, McGuire (1964) described two general ways in which beliefs can be given cognitive support. First, an individual can be given a refutational defense, which makes the belief stronger by exposing the individual to weak attacking arguments and refutations of these arguments. This defense is similar to the process of inoculation, through which an individual can be inoculated against an attacking virus by pre-exposure to a weakened dose of the virus. This weakened dose stimulates the individual's immune system to produce antibodies, which confer resistance to a stronger form of the virus. Alternatively, a belief can be given a supportive defense. This defense makes the belief "healthier" (i.e., more resistant) by providing the individual with supportive information and arguments and is analogous to providing the body with vitamins and exercise.
McGuire (1964) argued that the inoculation (refutational) approach is likely to be superior when the individual has been living in an environment in which his or her belief has not been attacked or threatened. In other words, pre-exposure to a weak attack should be particularly effective when the attack targets truisms. According to McGuire (1964) , the refutational defense should not only help people form arguments supporting truisms but also should motivate people to anticipate and refute subsequent counterarguments. To test this reasoning, McGuire (1964) conducted many experiments that examined the effect of inoculation on health truisms, such as the belief that people should brush their teeth after each meal. The typical paradigm involved two phases. In the first phase, participants were provided with either a refutational (inoculation) or supportive defense of a truism. To create a refutational defense, participants were asked to consider arguments against the truism and then to refute these arguments. To create a supportive defense, participants were simply asked to consider arguments supporting the truism. In the second phase, participants were exposed to an anti-truism essay and their subsequent endorsement of the truism was measured. Results indicated that the belief in the truism was significantly higher among participants who received the refutational defense than among participants who received a supportive defense or neither defense. Thus, the truistic beliefs became more resistant to attack following the provision of cognitive support, at least in the form of a refutational defense.
Nevertheless, the extant research has failed to replicate consistently the superiority of the refutational defense over the supportive defense, regardless of whether medical truisms (e.g., Farkas & Anderson, 1976; Pryor & Steinfatt, 1978) or more controversial beliefs are examined (e.g., Adams & Beatty, 1977; Benoit, 1991; Burgoon & Chase, 1973; Pfau et al., 1997; Syzbillo & Heslin, 1973) . Instead, the research unequivocally indicates that both the refutational and supportive defenses confer significant resistance to a persuasive attack. Although this pattern does not support (or refute)
McGuire's hypothesis that the refutational defense elicits unique motivational processes, it does support his additional suggestion that both refutational and supportive defenses confer the ability to rebut attacks through the provision of cognitive support. Thus, it is plausible that both refutational and supportive defenses should confer the ability to defend values.
Effects on Other Attitudes and Values
A relevant and interesting issue is whether providing support for one value can have beneficial effects on value-relevant attitudes and other values. Such effects should occur because of the centrality of values in cognitive networks of attitudes and beliefs. Indeed, this conjecture is supported by prior evidence using a value-selfconfrontation paradigm, which involves making people aware of discrepancies between personal values and the values of important peer groups. Rokeach (1973) noted that participants reported more favorable attitudes toward African Americans and a greater emphasis on prosocial values (e.g., national security, world at peace) after value-self-confrontation was used to bolster participants' value of equality.
However, most effects of value-self-confrontation have been small or nonsignificant (Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996) . These inconsistent effects could be due to the nature of the value-self-confrontation effect, the method of value measurement (Maio, Roese, Seligman, & Katz, 1996) , or other theoretical and methodological factors. Nonetheless, these issues make it important to examine the impact of an alternative manipulation of values. In particular, the provision of cognitive support for a single value may produce more reliable effects on a target value because the provision of cognitive support addresses the subjective rationale for holding the value and may supply reasons that can be used to support related attitudes and values. In contrast, the value-self-confrontation technique attempts to make a value seem more important without clearly addressing why it should be more important.
If this hypothesizing is correct, building cognitive support for a value also should be effective at bolstering related attitudes and values. Indeed, some of the evidence described above indicates that developing cognitive support for a value powerfully influences relevant behavior (Maio et al., 2001) , consistent with the hypothesis that cognitive support for one value can extend to relevant attitudes and values. There are at least two ways in which this extended effect may occur. First, people may alter relevant attitudes and values to be consistent with the focal value (see also Dillehay, Insko, & Smith, 1966; McGuire, 1960) . Second, the support for the target value should help sustain the network of relevant attitudes and values. Thus, the present research tested whether the provision of cognitive support for one value would make relevant attitudes and values more resistant to persuasion, in addition to conferring resistance to the target value itself.
The Present Research
The present research consisted of two experiments, which presented defenses for the value of equality and a persuasive attack against this value. We chose equality as our target value because of its theoretical and applied relevance. From a theoretical perspective, equality is a prototypical social value and is a vital part of numerous theories in social psychology (e.g., Katz & Hass, 1988; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Bertram, 1994; Rokeach, 1973) . From a practical perspective, previous evidence has shown that equality may be a general prejudice antidote (cf. Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000) because individuals who place a high emphasis on equality tend to be low in prejudice toward a range of outgroups (Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996; Pratto et al., 1994 ). Yet, there are cults and groups that occasionally expose young people to arguments against this value (e.g., skinheads, the British National Party). Thus, it is important to assess whether individuals easily yield to direct attacks on equality, unless they receive prior cognitive support for the value.
While addressing this issue, our experiments sought to address an additional issue arising from past research on inoculation theory. As noted by Eagly and Chaiken (1993) , "one barrier to evaluating inoculation theory is a relative absence of measures intended to assess directly the processes assumed to mediate resistance to change" (p. 565). Inoculation theory and contemporary models of persuasion (Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) assume that counterarguments against a message are a prime source of resistance to persuasion. We included a measure of message counter-arguing to test directly this assumption. The results for this measure are presented in a section following the description of both experiments, because cross-experimental analyses were more powerful and revealed stronger effects than when each experiment was analyzed separately. EXPERIMENT 1 In our first experiment, we gave participants "active" forms of the refutational and supportive defenses (see McGuire, 1964) . That is, participants were asked to generate their own arguments refuting and supporting the importance of equality. ("Passive" defenses expose people to prior arguments [McGuire, 1964] and were employed in Experiment 2.) In contrast, participants in the control condition did not perform any defense of equality. We expected that both defenses would confer resistance to the persuasive attack against equality, compared to the control condition. No predictions were made regarding differences between the refutational and supportive defenses because of the lack of consistent evidence revealing distinct effects of these defenses. Nonetheless, given that McGuire's methods have not been utilized in the context of values, it was important to include both defenses.
Equality-relevant attitudes. We also tested whether the active-refutational and active-supportive defenses would protect equality-relevant attitudes, in addition to the value itself. According to Rokeach (1973) , "an experimental treatment that leads to an increase in the value for equality . . . should also lead to a more favorable attitude toward the civil rights of others who are discriminated against-other minorities, the poor, the unemployed, and homosexuals" (p. 262). Thus, we expected that the provision of a refutational or supportive defense for equality would make participants endorse the value of equality and egalitarian attitudes more strongly following the attack against equality, compared to participants in the control condition.
Equality-relevant and irrelevant values.
We also included other values that are relevant and irrelevant to equality. In extensive cross-cultural research, Schwartz (1992) has predicted and found that human values can be arranged into four types serving different motivations. Equality is one of many self-transcendence values (e.g., helpfulness, honesty) that involve promoting the welfare of others and are distinct from values serving other motivations, such as needs for openness (i.e., pursuit of emotional and intellectual interests in uncertain directions) and needs for conservation (i.e., maintaining the status quo). In addition, self-transcendence values are distinct and incompatible with needs for self-enhancement (i.e., enhancing personal interests). Thus, self-transcendence and self-enhancement values are typically negatively correlated, but self-transcendence values are weakly or not correlated with conservation and openness values (Schwartz, 1992) . The independence of self-transcendence and openness values also has been demonstrated in three studies by Maio and Olson (1998) , who found that eliciting reasons for self-transcendence values caused these values, to change but did not produce changes on openness values. Therefore, we tested whether the defenses of equality would prevent any negative effects of the persuasive attacks against equality on other self-transcendence values, while having a weaker impact on openness values.
Method

PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 75 undergraduate students (53 women, 21 men, and 1 who did not indicate his or her sex) who participated for course credit or £3 (U.S.$4.50). Five additional participants were deleted from the analysis because they failed to follow instructions (n = 2) or because of suspicion (n = 3).
OVERVIEW
Participants took part individually. They were told that they would be given research surveys concerning their attitudes toward a variety of topics. The experimental manipulation was presented in the first survey, which gave participants a refutational defense of equality, a supportive defense of equality, or no defense (control). Following the experimental manipulation, all participants read a short essay attacking the value of equality. Next, participants completed measures of the importance of equality, equality-relevant attitudes, selftranscendence values, and openness values. To reduce socially desirable responding, participants were instructed that all of their responses would be completely anonymous and confidential and they were asked to place each questionnaire in a blank envelope upon completion. Finally, participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed.
EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION: ACTIVE DEFENSES OF EQUALITY
Participants in the refutational condition were asked to write reasons opposing "equality (i.e., equal opportunity for all)" before refuting each reason. In contrast, participants in the supportive condition were simply asked to write reasons in support of "equality (i.e., equal opportunity for all)." Participants in both conditions were given one page to describe their reasons and were asked to list as many reasons as they could. The instructions stated that the reasons did not necessarily have to be participants' own but could be reasons that someone else might offer. In both conditions, participants were given 8 min to complete their respective tasks. Control participants did not engage in any defense of equality.
ESSAY ATTACKING EQUALITY
The essay attacking the value of equality was three pages long and it was structurally similar to the antitruism essays used by McGuire (1964) . The opening paragraph reported that a group of philosophers have questioned the validity of equality as an ideal, stating that the idea of "equal opportunity for all" is, in fact, illogical. The essay then described reasons why equality is questionable as an ideal. For example, one argument attacked the feasibility of providing equal opportunities in the workplace. The essay indicated that a Canadian city's firefighter brigade was instructed by the city government to interview an equal number of female and male applicants for a new firefighter position. The essay alleged that the firefighting brigade received 92 applications from men and only 4 from women. Consequently, the firefighting brigade was forced to interview only four men and four women. The essay noted that two of the female candidates lacked relevant experience, and none of the female candidates passed the physical strength requirements for the position, such as lifting a 14-stone dummy up a flight of stairs. In short, the essay argued that the strict application of equality forced the fire brigade to select from a small pool of applicants, thereby reducing the fire brigade's safety and efficiency in emergencies. The essay concluded by stating that the ideal of equality is only a useful catchword for politicians at election time and that this ideal is irrelevant to real life, where true equality is neither possible nor desired.
2
DEPENDENT MEASURES
Importance of equality. For the first and main dependent measure, participants were asked to rate their agreement with the statement, "Equality is important." As in McGuire's (1964) studies on truisms, this rating was made using a scale from 1 (definitely false) to 15 (definitely true).
Post-attack thoughts about equality. We examined the extent to which participants counterargued the essay's proposal that equality is unimportant. To examine this counterarguing, participants were asked to list their thoughts concerning equality; their responses were content analyzed using a coding scheme derived from previous studies (e.g., Maio et al., 2001; Maio & Olson, 1998) . Specifically, one rater counted participants' (a) reasons supporting equality, (b) reasons opposing equality, and (c) nonreasons. The total amount of message counterarguing was calculated as the number of equalitysupporting reasons minus the number of equalityopposing reasons. To examine the reliability of this index, a second rater independently coded a subset of 20 participants' reasons. The second rater's index was significantly correlated with the first rater's index, r(18) = .91, p < .001.
Equality-relevant attitudes. Participants were then given a 13-item attitude survey that asked them to rate their favorability toward legislation and policies that promote equal opportunities for minority groups. Example items include, "legislation to promote lesbian and gay equality rights," "equal opportunity programs," "increased immigration into Britain," and "legislation to promote equal rights for men and women." Participants rated their attitude toward each item by using a scale ranging from -3 (extremely unfavorable) to +3 (extremely favorable). Responses to the 13 items were averaged to provide an overall index of participants' equality-relevant attitudes. This scale possessed good internal consistency (α = .78).
Equality-relevant and irrelevant values.
Participants were given a 10-item value survey containing five self-transcendence values (protecting the environment, helpfulness, spiritual life, honesty, and equality) and five openness values (freedom, daring, independence, choosing own goals, and exciting life). Participants were asked to rate each value in terms of its importance as a guiding principle in their life. Following Schwartz (1992) , participants rated the values by using a 9-point scale that was marked with the following labels: -1 (opposed to my values), 0 (not important), 3 (important), 6 (very important), and 7 (extremely important). Participants' ratings for the values were averaged to form indices of self-transcendence (α = .66) and openness values (α = .71).
Results and Discussion
For each of the dependent variables, preliminary analyses revealed no main effects or interactions involving sex of participant. Consequently, sex was not included as a factor in the reported analyses.
3
IMPORTANCE OF EQUALITY
To test whether the provision of cognitive support made the value of equality less vulnerable to the attack, we conducted a one-way ANOVA (refutational vs. supportive vs. control) on participants' post-attack agreement with the statement that "equality is important." A significant main effect was revealed, F(2, 72) = 4.07, p < .02. The relevant means are depicted in Table 1 . As expected, participants in the refutational condition considered equality to be more important after exposure to the essay than did participants in the control condition, t(72) = 2.71, p < .01. Similarly, participants in the supportive condition considered equality to be more important than did participants in the control condition, t(72) = 2.13, p < .05. The difference between the refutational and supportive conditions was in the direction predicted by McGuire (1964) but was not significant, t(72) = 0.57, ns.
EQUALITY-RELEVANT ATTITUDES
As shown in Table 1 , participants in the refutational (M = 12.53, SD = 9.24) and the supportive (M = 11.98, SD = 7.38) conditions tended to express more favorability toward equality-affirming policies than did participants in the control condition (M = 9.15, SD = 9.13). However, a one-way ANOVA indicated that these differences were not significant, F(2, 72) = 1.10, ns.
EQUALITY-RELEVANT AND IRRELEVANT VALUES
Participants' ratings of the self-transcendence and openness values were subjected to a 3 (condition: refutational vs. supportive vs. control) × 2 (value type: self-transcendence values vs. openness values) mixedmodel ANOVA, with repeated measures on the second factor. The results indicated a significant Condition × Value Type interaction, F(2, 72) = 3.20, p < .05. The relevant means are depicted in Table 1 . Examination of this interaction supported our predictions: Participants in both the refutational (M = 5.14, SD = .90) and the supportive condition (M = 5.20, SD = 1.14) considered the self-transcendence values to be more important after the persuasive attack than did participants in the control condition (M = 4.50, SD = 1.08), t(72) = 2.38, p < .02, and t(72) = 2.16, p < .04, respectively. Furthermore, as with participants' ratings of equality, participants' ratings of the self-transcendence values did not significantly differ between the refutational and supportive conditions, t(72) = .20, ns. As expected, ratings of the openness values did not significantly differ between conditions (all ps > .40).
REASONS IN THE REFUTATIONAL AND SUPPORTIVE CONDITIONS
Consistent with past research (e.g., Maio & Olson, 1998; Maio et al., 2001 ), we tested whether participants' generation of cognitive support predicted our primary dependent measure, which assessed the post-attack importance of equality. We expected that participants' post-attack ratings of equality would be related to the number of supportive arguments and refutations listed in the refutational condition and the number of supporting arguments in the supportive condition. In the refutational condition, an argument against equality and then a subsequent refutation were coded as a single item. As expected, results indicated that these correlations were positive and significant in both the refutational, r(24) = .33, p = .05 (one-tailed), and supportive condition, r(25) = .40, p < .05 (one-tailed).
SUMMARY
Consistent with our predictions, participants who engaged in either a refutational or supportive defense of equality considered equality to be more important after a subsequent persuasive attack than did control partici- pants, who had not received a defense prior to the persuasive attack. In fact, the defenses conferred support to self-transcendence values in general and there was a similar but nonsignificant effect on equality-relevant attitudes. Of importance, however, these defenses did not simply strengthen all values because the defenses did not affect the openness values. This finding is important because it indicates that providing cognitive support for one value makes relevant values more resistant to persuasive attacks but cognitive support may not bolster irrelevant values to the same extent. EXPERIMENT 2 In Experiment 2, we wished to begin testing the practical limits of the effects obtained in Experiment 1. Previous research has demonstrated that elaboration of attitudes can increase resistance after a delay of up to 1 week between the initial elaboration and the attacking message (Haugvedt, Schumann, Schneier, & Warren, 1994) . We were interested in testing whether a refutational defense could elicit resistance to value change even after a delay. We focused on the refutational defense for applied reasons. Specifically, this defense is easy to use in real-world settings (e.g., education programs, rehabilitation) because it is not heavy-handed or directive. Unlike the supportive defense, people are not told to form support for a value-they are free to evaluate it as they like.
Nonetheless, Maio et al. (2001) suggested that simple interventions should decay over time and that a repeated, involving intervention should exert the strongest effects. This prediction is based on the simple fact that repetition helps to store information in long-term memory (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968) . Consequently, despite the potential delayed effect of a brief refutational defense, a simple refutational defense should be complemented by a second refutational defense after a delay. In other words, an initial refutational defense and a subsequent defense should elicit independent, additive effects on the resistance of values to attack.
We tested this reasoning by manipulating whether participants engaged in a passive-refutational defense 1 to 4 days before a second, active-refutational defense. By choosing a mix of passive and active defenses, we hoped to maximize the chance that the two defenses would produce complementary effects. In addition, we chose to provide the passive defense first because this procedure would expose participants to novel reasons that could be used later in the active defense.
Method
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 70 students (52 women, 18 men) who participated for course credit. Five additional participants failed to complete the second experimental session, 1 additional participant failed to complete the experimental manipulation, and 3 additional participants were deleted because of suspicion.
OVERVIEW
Participants took part individually and completed two separate laboratory sessions. In the first session, participants received a passive-refutational defense of equality or no defense of the value. One to 4 days later, participants took part in a partial replication of Experiment 1, which manipulated whether they completed an activerefutational defense of equality before reading an essay attacking the value. As in Experiment 1, the dependent measures assessed the importance of equality, equalityrelevant attitudes, self-transcendence values, and openness values. Finally, participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed.
EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS
Initial passive defense. In the passive-refutational defense condition, participants were asked in the first session to read 20 reasons for considering equality to be important or unimportant. Participants were told that these reasons had been obtained in previous experiments (e.g., Maio & Olson, 1998) and were asked to rate the strength (plausibility) of each reason on a 9-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all strong) to 8 (extremely strong). The first 10 reasons supported the importance of equality and the last 10 reasons opposed the value. For example, a reason for equality was "If people were all treated equally, social conflict would be reduced"; a reason against equality was "If people are treated equally, it is not possible for them to succeed or fail according to their own merit." Participants were then asked to write out the eight strongest reasons for or against the importance of equality. Participants were given 12 min to complete the defense.
In the passive control condition, participants were asked to read reasons that previous participants had provided for liking or disliking coffee (see Maio & Olson, 1998) . The remainder of the instructions were identical to those in the passive-refutational defense condition, except that participants were asked to rate and write reasons for liking or disliking coffee rather than reasons for considering equality to be important or unimportant.
Active defense. In the second session (1 to 4 days later), we manipulated whether participants engaged in an active-refutational defense of equality. The instructions and procedures for these manipulations were identical to those used in Experiment 1.
DEPENDENT MEASURES
All of the dependent measures were identical to those used in Experiment 1.
Results
IMPORTANCE OF EQUALITY
To test whether the manipulations made participants more resistant to the anti-equality essay, post-attack ratings of the importance of equality were analyzed in a 2 (passive defense vs. passive control) × 2 (active defense vs. active control) between-subjects ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of the passive defense, F(1, 66) = 6.51, p < .02, such that participants who were given this defense considered equality to be more important (M = 11.35) following the essay attack than did participants in the passive control condition (M = 9.92). There was also a main effect of the active defense, F(1, 66) = 4.30, p < .05, such that participants who engaged in this defense considered equality to be more important (M = 11.20) following the attack than did participants in the active control condition (M = 10.02). There was no significant interaction between the passive and active defenses, F(1, 66) = .17, ns.
Overall, as shown in Table 2 , pairwise comparisons revealed that participants who received the combination of the passive defense and active defense (M = 12.06, SD = 1.85) considered equality to more important than participants who had received the passive-control/activedefense combination (M = 10.65, SD = 2.06), t(66) = 1.75, p < .10, the passive-defense/active-control combination, (M = 10.39, SD = 2.06), t(66) = 2.06, p < .05, and the passive-control/active-control combination (M = 9.44, SD = 3.11), t(66) = 3.34, p < .01. None of the other pairwise contrasts approached significance (all ps > .20).
EQUALITY-RELEVANT ATTITUDES
Participants' scores on the index of equality-relevant attitudes were analyzed in a 2 (passive defense vs. passive control) × 2 (active defense vs. active control) betweensubjects ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of the passive defense, F(1, 65) = 5.57, p < .03, such that participants who had completed this defense indicated more favorable attitudes toward egalitarian policies (M = 14.81) than did participants who had not completed the defense (M = 10.58). There was also a main effect of the active defense, F(1, 65) = 6.47, p < .02, such that participants who engaged in this defense expressed more favorable attitudes toward egalitarian policies (M = 14.91) than did participants who had not performed the defense (M = 10.37). The Passive Defense × Active Defense interaction was not significant, F(1, 65) = .48, ns.
Overall, as shown in Table 2 , the combination of the passive defense and active defense (M = 17.88, SD = 7.99) elicited more favorable attitudes toward egalitarian policies than did the combination of the passive control and the active defense (M = 11.94, SD = 8.27), t(65) = 2.24, p < .05, the passive defense and the active control, (M = 12.28, SD = 2.06), t(65) = 2.15, p < .05, and the passive control and the active control (M = 8.89, SD = 5.18), t(65) = 3.44, p < .01. None of the other pairwise contrasts were significant (all ps > .20).
EQUALITY-RELEVANT AND IRRELEVANT VALUES
Participants' ratings of the self-transcendence and the openness values were subjected to a 2 (passive defense vs. passive control) × 2 (active defense vs. active control) × 2 (value type: self-transcendence vs. openness) mixed-model ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor. There was a main effect of the active defense, F(1, 66) = 11.30, p < .001, such that participants who performed the active defense subsequently considered both the self-transcendence and openness values (M = 5.20) to be more important after the persuasive attack than did participants in the active control condition (M = 4.62). This effect was qualified by a marginal Active Defense × Value Type interaction, F(1, 66) = 2.80, p = .09. 4 Given our specific predictions, we conducted pairwise contrasts to examine this interaction. Results indicated that participants who engaged in the active defense considered the self-transcendence values to be more important (M = 5.20) than did (control) participants who did not engage in an active defense of equality (M = 4.47), t(66) = 5.10, p < .001. Surprisingly, participants who engaged in an active defense also rated the openness values as being more important (M = 5.19) than did (control) participants who did not engage in an active defense (M = 4.79), t(66) = 2.68, p < .01. Nonetheless, the interaction indicates that the effect of the active defense on self-transcendence values was stronger than the effect of the active defense on the openness values.
Reasons in the active condition. In the active defense, participants were asked to provide arguments against equality followed by a subsequent rebuttal of these arguments. As in Experiment 1, we tested whether the postattack ratings of equality were related to the number of items the participants had listed. Results revealed a correlation in the expected direction, r(34) = .22, but unlike Experiment 1, the correlation did not reach conventional criteria for statistical significance, p = .10 (onetailed).
SUMMARY
Experiment 2 replicated and extended the results from Experiment 1 by finding that the provision of cognitive support for equality again enhanced resistance to an anti-equality message. This effect occurred regardless of whether the cognitive support was provided in a passive or active manner and was found for the value of equality, equality-relevant attitudes, and selftranscendence values (although a similar but weaker effect was found for the openness values). Moreover, the effect of the initial, passive defense occurred despite the implementation of a delay between it and the attack.
MEDIATING MECHANISMS ACROSS EXPERIMENTS
A key finding from the research based on the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986 ) is that higher levels of elaboration are related to increased levels of counterarguing of attacking messages (Haugvedt & Petty, 1992; Haugvedt & Wegener, 1994) . Therefore, in the present studies, providing defenses for a value should enable people to build a network of information about the value, which should confer the ability to counterargue subsequent attacks against the value. These counterarguments should, in turn, increase the post-attack importance attached to the value.
We tested this reasoning using regression analyses across both experiments. These analyses tested whether participants who had received a defense of equality (i.e., a supportive or refutational defense in Study 1; activerefutational, passive-refutational, or both defenses in Study 2) listed more counterarguments against the notion that equality was unimportant than participants in the control conditions for both experiments, using our index of the number of counterarguments minus the number of supporting arguments (see Experiment 1). In addition, these analyses tested whether the effect of the defenses on ratings of the importance of equality was mediated by participants' counterarguing of the message.
To test this mediational mechanism, we followed a procedure described by R. M. Baron and Kenny (1986) . First, we regressed participants' post-attack ratings of equality on a dummy-coded variable (0 vs. 1) that reflected whether participants had received a prior defense of equality. Results indicated a significant effect of the defense variable, β = .29, t(142) = 3.56, p < .001. Second, we regressed participants' counterarguing scores on the defense variable. Results indicated that the effect of the defenses was significant, β = .14, t(141) = 1.70, p < .05 (one-tailed).
5 Third, we regressed participants' post-attack ratings of equality on the defense variable and the counterargumentation scores. Results indicated a large and significant effect of the counterargumentation index, β = .52, t(140) = 7.52, p < .001, and a smaller effect of the defense variable, β = .21, t(140) = 3.02, p < .01. The reduction in the effect of the defenses from the first regression (β = .29) to the last regression (β = .21) was significant with a Sobel test, z = 1.65, p < .05 (one-tailed). According to R. M. Baron and Kenny (1986) , the reduction in beta for the defense variable and the significant effects of the defenses on counterargumentation (second regression) and of counterargumentation on equality (third regression) indicate that message counterargumentation partially mediated the effect of the defense on the post-attack importance of equality.
We also expected that the post-attack importance of equality would mediate the effects of the cognitive support generated in the defenses and the counterarguments elicited by the message on equality-relevant attitudes and on self-transcendence values. Consequently, in a second set of regression analyses, we tested whether participants who had generated more cognitive support in the active defenses (either refutational or supportive) across both experiments listed more counterarguments against the notion that equality was unimportant. Thus, control participants were not included in this analysis. We also tested whether these counterarguments mediated the effect of the cognitive support on the importance that participants attached to equality following the persuasive attack. Subsequent analyses tested whether the post-attack importance of equality mediated the effects of the cognitive support and the counterarguments on equality-relevant attitudes and on selftranscendence values.
As shown in Figure 1 , the amount of cognitive support that participants listed in the active defenses predicted the proportion of counterarguments listed after reading the essay, β = .23, t(65) = 1.93, p < .06, which predicted the post-attack importance of equality, β = .57, t(65) = 5.58, p < .001. The post-attack importance of equality, in turn, predicted the post-attack favorability of equality-relevant attitudes, β = .49, t(65) = 4.50, p < .001, and the importance of self-transcendence values, β = .53, t(65) = 5.02, p < .001. More important, these effects on equality, equality-relevant attitudes, and self-transcendence values remained significant even after the other paths to these variables were controlled (see Figure 1) . Thus, the counterarguments mediated the effect of the cognitive support on the importance that participants attached to equality after the persuasive attack. In addition, the postattack importance that participants attached to the value of equality mediated the effect of the counterarguments on the equality-relevant attitudes and self-transcendence values.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across the two experiments, the results indicated that several types of defenses can make values more resistant to attack. Experiment 1 showed that active-refutational and active-supportive defenses can make the value of equality less vulnerable to an anti-equality message. Similarly, Experiment 2 showed that both a passiverefutational defense and an active-refutational defense can make equality more resistant to attack. These findings are consistent with previous findings for both truistic and nontruistic beliefs. Yet, this evidence is the first to show that these effects can be obtained for social values, which, ironically, are the constructs that were at the center of seminal speculations about resistance to persuasion (McGuire, 1964) .
Experiment 2 also showed that the combination of passive and active defenses over a 4-day period produced the most resistance to a persuasive attack. This finding confirms prior suggestions (e.g., Maio et al., 2001 ) that cognitive support for values is more effective when it is elicited in an involving manner over time. In addition, this finding is consistent with prior evidence that double defenses (i.e., active and passive defenses; McGuire, 1961; Tannenbaum, McCauley, & Norris, 1966) are more effective at promoting resistance to attacking messages.
Power of the Defenses
The power of the value defenses is noteworthy for two reasons. First, as shown in Experiment 2, a refutational defense protected values even after a delay of several days. Second, across both experiments, the defenses influenced the resistance of other relevant attitudes and values to attack. The broad potential impact of values has long been one of the key arguments for the uniqueness and importance of values. Consequently, it is noteworthy that participants who had engaged in a prior defense were more favorable toward a wide range of policies supporting equality after receiving the persuasive attack than were participants who received no defense. Although this pattern did not reach conventional levels of significance in Experiment 1, the mean effect size across both studies was moderate, d = .57 (see J. Cohen, 1988) . These results support Rokeach's (1973) contention that any manipulation bolstering a specific value will have beneficial effects on relevant attitudes.
Regarding the effects on values, participants in Experiment 1 who performed either an active-refutational or active-supportive defense of equality considered selftranscendence values to be more important after the persuasive attack than did the control participants. Similarly, in Experiment 2, participants who engaged in an active-refutational defense considered self-transcendence values to be more important after the persuasive attack 72 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
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Self than did participants in the control condition. Across the two experiments, the mean effect of the defenses (vs. control) on the self-transcendence values was moderate, d = .54 (see Cohen, 1988) . In contrast, the mean effect of the defenses on the openness values was very small, d = .07. To our knowledge, these data provide the first documented evidence that manipulations of one value influence other related values (cf. Rokeach, 1973) . Moreover, our procedure did not force changes in related values by using an ipsative ranking procedure to assess values, and our results conform to a specific a priori theory about the relations between values (Schwartz, 1992) .
Mediating Mechanism
An important issue is the mechanism through which the defenses elicited these effects. It could be argued that our defenses increased resistance to value change by making the value salient because evaluations of constructs are more persistent over time when the evaluations are accessible than when they are not (Bassili & Fletcher, 1991) . Nevertheless, the beginning of our attacking message itself made the value salient, which should weaken or eliminate effects of prior salience (see also Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988) . In addition, given that people lack cognitive support for their values (Maio & Olson, 1998) , it is unlikely that mere awareness of a value would mobilize the motivational and cognitive resources necessary to rebut a persuasive attack. Indeed, Maio et al. (2001) found that value salience did not increase value-consistent behavior in a situation that challenged values.
Our path analysis across both experiments revealed support for a different mechanism. As expected, the defenses increased counterargumentation of the attack against the notion that equality is unimportant, which led to increased post-attack importance of equality. Moreover, when participants completed the defenses, those who generated more cognitive support for the value counterargued the attack against equality more strongly. This increased counterargumentation led to greater post-attack importance of this value, which, in turn, predicted more favorable equality-relevant attitudes and more important self-transcendence values. Thus, cognitive support for one value influenced relevant attitudes and values through its effect on the target value. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical evidence describing mechanisms that mediate the effects of the defenses on persuasion.
Application and Extensions
Future research should investigate the merits of different types of refutational defenses. McGuire (1964) found that refutational defenses elicited more resistance to persuasion than supportive defenses, which he attributed to the notion that refutational defenses made people aware that their beliefs could be threatened, which motivated them to defend their beliefs by generating more supporting arguments. However, the null differences between the refutational and supportive defenses in Experiment 1 reduce the plausibility that the refutational defense is always more threatening and motivation-enhancing than the supportive defense. Indeed, McGuire (1964) indicated that other factors might moderate whether the refutational and supportive defenses are threatening. For example, when an active defense is used, people who perform a refutational defense may feel so confident about a truism that they find it difficult to think of counterarguments. Nevertheless, people who perform an active supportive defense may feel threatened because they have difficulty retrieving even a few supportive reasons (see Maio & Olson, 1998) . In short, it is difficult to determine precisely how motivational processes are engaged by the refutational and supportive defenses without considering other factors (e.g., ease of retrieval, order of active vs. passive defenses; see Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & Schwarz, 1999; Insko, 1967; McGuire, 1964; Schwarz et al., 1991) . For instance, it is possible that self-affirmation motives are influenced by the defenses (G. L. Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Steele, 1988) . That is, given the importance of values such as equality to the self-concept, thinking and writing about equality may bolster feelings about the self. Ironically, however, this self-affirmation process can make people more amenable to change on unrelated issues (G. L. Cohen et al., 2000) . Thus, an interesting question is whether the refutational and supportive defenses decrease resistance to persuasion on irrelevant issues. Another interesting issue is whether the defenses influence resistance to dry, cognitive persuasive attacks more than resistance to emotive attacks (see Fabrigar & Petty, 1998) .
In summary, results from two experiments demonstrated that people are more resistant to anti-value appeals after they have been given an opportunity to build cognitive support for the value. This effect is important because attacks against values can have dramatic effects, despite the conviction with which values are held. By building arguments relevant to values, people can arrive at subjectively rational, stronger values. Not only are the values that receive this support more resistant to attack, other relevant attitudes and values are bolstered. Thus, the simple provision of cognitive support for a single value has powerful and important effects. This evidence comes over four decades since it was first suggested that social values would benefit from additional cognitive support (McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961) . We hope to see significantly more advancement on this issue in the next four decades. NOTES 1. The importance of values distinguishes them from related psychological constructs such as attitudes, which are dispositions to evaluate an attitude object with favor or disfavor (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998) . Values and attitudes are also measured differently. People rate values in terms of their importance as guiding principles in their life, whereas attitudes are measured using scales that reflect varying degrees of favorability toward an object (see Feather, 1990; Maio & Olson, 1998) .
2. On occasion, people see similar arguments in debates on affirmative action. Nonetheless, these debates focus almost exclusively on the conflict between affirmative action programs and beliefs about meritocracy, not on the merits of equality per se. In this article, the arguments were used to directly attack the value of equality. To verify that our persuasive essay was effective, 20 additional participants completed our 15-point scale assessing the importance of equality (see below), without being exposed to the attacking message. We then compared these ratings with participants' ratings in the control (attack only) conditions from both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. A oneway ANOVA revealed a significant effect of the attack, F(2, 62) = 14.80, p < .001. As expected, planned contrasts revealed that these additional participants who had not been exposed to the persuasive message considered equality to be more important (M = 13.75) than participants who had been exposed to the persuasive attack in both Experiment 1 (M = 10.04), t(57) = 4.75, p < .001, and Experiment 2 (M = 9.80), t(57) = 4.78, p < .001. Thus, in the absence of a defense, the persuasive message significantly reduced the importance that participants attached to equality. In fact, the degree of movement on the scale was large (3.71 to 3.95 points; 29% to 31% of the possible change).
3. Null effects of sex also were obtained in Experiment 2. 4. The main effect also was qualified by a marginal Passive Defense × Active Defense interaction, F(1, 66) = 3.55, p < .07. Given that we had no prior predictions regarding this nonsignificant interaction, we did not examine it any further.
5. This effect becomes stronger (p < .03) when the dummy-coded defense variable compares the control conditions with only the two defense conditions from Experiment 1 and the double-defense condition in Experiment 2, excluding the single-defense conditions from Experiment 2. This comparison may be the strongest test of our prediction because it involves the conditions that yielded the strongest effects on post-attack ratings of equality (perhaps because they all elicited recent support for the value).
